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(Robinson, Continued from P. 1) 
insignificant, she sought to have the 
facul ty' s efforts focused on methods 
of addressing the school's serious 
problems with education. 
Of late, she has concentrated at the 
Department of Public Advocacy on 
death penalty trials and appeals . 
Her specialty, for which she is 
nationally known, is jury composition 
challenges. Gail always has time for 
sharing her knowledge with other 
attorneys wherever or whenever. 
She and her husband, Kevin McNally, 
are the proud parents of Sean Fi tz 
and Jesse Dylan with another child on 
the way in April. Even though an 
ardent vegetarian, she has been known 
to crave a "good" hamburger when 
pregnant. Her free time is spent 
with her children, "the land" that 
she lives on in Bald Knob (just 
Northwest of Frankfort), her food 
co-op, and the magnificent house she 
helped construct. 
As her life attests, she feels that 
the most important value she and 
Kevin teac h their children is the 
ser vice of others in need . 
We are in 
personal and 
'!banks, Gail, 
of yourself . 
ED MONAHAN 
Gail's debt for her 
professional example . 
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Judge Richard Fitzgerald on District Court Practice 
( See Page 19 ) 
PATRICK MCNALLY 
Pa t McNal l y, Di rector of ou r Hazard 
Office, which se r ves Perry, Les l ie 
and Letcher Coun t i es , says that trial 
practice i n Eastern Kentucky provides 
powerful and tense courtrooms where 
one learns to be assertive or get 
"devoured " in the process. 
Pat came to the Department as a 
graduate (Hay '82 ) from the Uni-
versi ty of Tennessee, George C. 
Taylor School of Law. He has been 
wi th the Hazard office for the pas t 
four years. His work there has been 
described as "extremely conscientious 
and enthusiastic· by Gail Robinson, 
who was the Eastern District 
Supervisor. "Pat works extremely hard 
for our office, not just covering the 
bases but really interested in 
unexplored legal issues and avenues. 
He calls often to discuss his ideas 
and questions. And he cares about 
what happens to his clients. He's 
great! " 
Pat's favorite part of his job is the 
trial work. He likes the "nervous 
sensation" when he's in front of a 
jury. He paraphrases the Credo of Jim 
Doherty as his guiding rod as a pulic 
defender. " Answer all doubts in favor 
of your client and agressively argue 
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and present that person's case." Last 
year Pat bad plenty of chances to put 
that philosophy into effect as he 
opened 246 cases, 57% of which were 
felony cases. 
He and his wife, Carla, like Hazard 
and the Appalachian Mountains. Carla 
is a nursing student at Hazard 
Communi ty Coll ege. Not surprisingly, 
Pat lists his interests as fiShing, 
hiking and camping in the Smokie 
Mountains and the Cherokee National 
Forest. 
Pa t u s ually begins his day wi th a 
morning run in the hills, with Hogan, 
the family pet dog. 
Aside from outdoor · activi ties, Pat 
mentioned his love of travel (perhaps 
sparked by his birth in Germany where 
his father was stationed while in the 
service). Pat spent a summer travel-
ing in Europe. He became fluent in 
Italian when he spent his junior year 
of college at Wake-Forest University 
abroad, studying history and art at 
the University of Venice. 
Pat's parents are Hank and Hareth 
McNally. They live in St. Louis, 
Missouri. Pat says his parents 
instilled in bim the trait to 
carefully examine the obvious and not 
to quickly jump to conclusions. 
Perhaps, this would explain his mom's 
occasional reference to Pat's 
contentious nature as a child. 
Scott Buchanan has said that "Eve ry 
human being has a responsibility for 
injustice anywhere in the community." 
Pa t' s meeting his r ,es ponsibi li ty and 
then some. 
EDITORS 
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Law and Comment 
SI LENCUG GIDEON'S TR\WET: 
THE PL I GHT OF THE III)IGEMT PR I SOMER 
Every prisoner dreMS the dreMI of 
GI deon; I a two page .l!:£. ~ hand-
wr Itten petit Ion f II ed I n the 
United States Supreme Court Is 
read, believed, and the unjust 
conviction Is reversed. A new trial 
Is had, counsel Is appointed, and 
when brought before the jury once 
again, there Is an acquittal. Then 
again, In IIIOSt Instances Gideon's 
draa. Is just that, a dre~. We are 
tllught to be 11 eve that the """,sure 
of Justice received I s not depen-
dent upon the alllOunt of money one 
possesses. As long a,s we adopt the 
notion that the practIce of crimi-
na l law I s a form of free 
enterprise, the quality of justi ce 
will always be stra ined by money. 
Noothere Is this fact so evident as 
1 n our own pr I son syst..... Where 
even litter convictIon. money talks. 
The bright line rule delineating 
the right to counsel--that the 
state .ust provl de an attorney to 
any defendllnt, too poor to hIre 
one, who faces a pr I son sentence--
stops at the penitentIary gate when 
one's appelll as lI..atter of rIght 
hilS been exhausted. It I s as though 
f I nail y, soc I ety says enough, and 
throws away the key. But It Is hard 
to forget. 
lGldeon v. WainwrIght, 372 U.S. 335 
(19631, (extended the Sixth 
Alnend_nt right to counse I to the 
states through the Fourteenth 
AlDendment. Held, there I s an 
absolute rIght to appointment of 
counsel, even when IndIgent, felony 
c~ses) • 
S low l Y but surel y the pr I son wall s 
have been eroded by the public ' s 
I ncreas I ng awareness of the sord I d 
conditions whIch o ften characterize 
prison lIfe. And, In a sense, 
GIdeon's dream dId come true when a 
federal court found Kentucky's 
prisons unconstitutional due to an 
I """,te I nit lilted c I ass IIct I on su I t 
that Indicted the entire prison 
system. finally, the judiciary 
abandoned Its traditional hands-off 
po l icy. Stll I, to suggest that the 
system treats the poor and I nd 1-
gent, the uneducated and II lit-
erate, equa l ly, Is ludicrous. 
Money stll I till ks, and for those 
fortunate few wi th a mod I cum of 
educlltlon, at l east If money can't, 
they Clln. 
However, even convicted felons re-
tal n ""'ny constl tutlonal rights. 
Those rights, such as thel r first 
amendment rights, the prohl blt lon 
aga I nst crue I and unusual pun I sh-
mant, due process In pr I son pro-
ceedings, and protection against 
discrimination, would be hollow 
wI thout access to the courts to 
enforce thOd. RIghts without reme-
d' es are l118an I ng I ess and access to 
the judicial process Is the con-
stitut iona l key upon which all 
other pr I soner rI ghts rest. I tis 
for th I s very reason that court 
access, grounded In the Fourteenth 
........ nd_nt and buttressed by the 
fIrst, Is a right of const itut ional 
dimension. Johnson v. Avery, 393 
U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hul I , 312 
U.S. 546 (19411. Yet, In exercIs Ing 
the r i ght of access to the courts, 
It Is the Indi gent and uneducated 
that suffer . They face a I most I n-
-10-
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surmountab l e obstacles and handi-
caps not shared by the I r I1IOneyed 
counterparts. One need only examine 
those areas that are prerequl sl tes 
to lIEIanlngfu l court access, to 
reach the conc lus i on that wea l th 
makes a difference. 
I nd I gents and 1111 terates are un-
able to buy or obta i n valuable 
sources of I nformation, such as 
court docuIII8nts, that cou I d be 
evl dence before II tl gat I on I seven 
begun. Although the financially 
able can buy a trial transcrIpt to 
search for potent i al error, the 
I nd I gent pr I soner has no right In 
the preparatIon of hi s petItIon. 
Even ~ forma pauper! s st and 1 ng Is 
dl scret lonary, and that's assuml ng 
that the ~ ~ pet i tion has not 
been dismissed on a procedural 
error. Moreover. as one proceeds 
through the judicIal process Into 
the post-conviction real .. , the term 
Indlgency I s Increasl ngly scruti-
nized and ~re strictly defined. 
ThIs I s caapllcated by the non-
exl stent opportun Ity to cure the 
Indlgency through legItiMate am-
p I oyll8nt, gIven the stat e pay wage 
scheme. Many times the uneducated 
and I I I I terata are unabl e to ade-
quately Catllllun lcate their grievance 
to anyone, are Incapable of draft-
I ng an understandable compla int 
.lthout SOC1I8 kind of legal assis-
tance, and s ince t hey can not read, 
access to a la. II brary I s pol nt-
less. Therefore, the questIon be-
COlll8S ""at ass I stance must be pro-
v I ded to pr I soners to make the 
right of access mandated by Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, ~24 (1977), 
"mean I ngful." The obvious dlscrr .. -
Inatlon between those !'11th re-
sources and those wi thout, between 




recogn I zl ng 
tenslve constitutional 
lflDSanlngfulti court access. 
on Iy be 
a coex-
right of 
The constitutional right to ass i s-
t ance of counsel I n a post-oonv I c-
tion sett ing Is separate and d i s-
tinct fran the r ight to counsel 
found In the Sixth ...... ndment. In 
this context, attorney assistance 
means that each pr i soner has access 
to an attorney In the Inst itutIon 
to advise, aId, review pro ~ 
pleadIngs, and/or help the Inmate 
draft Initial pleadings and .. otlons 
to gain the court' s hearing. It 
means that ~ prisoners have at 
least one avenue availab l e for dis-
cuss I ng the mer i ts of the i r case 
and for obtaining advice In over-
COIling procedural problems. More-
over, where a merltorioos Issue is 
presented, the attorney l1IIIy under-
take full representat ion of the 
prisoner to Insure those c l aims are 
proper I y presented to the court. 
Surprisingly, the Kentucky l egis-
l ature and the United States 
District Court joined force s to 
provide for attorney assistance in 
Kentucky's penal InstitutIons. In 
thI s respect, Kentucky I s a l eader 
In Its recogn i tion that meaningful 
access to the courts can on I y be 
had through attorney assistance. It 
Is through such assistance that the 
THE WIZARD OF ID 
inherent unfairness and Invidious 
discrimination f aced by Indigents 
and illiterates confined in penal 
Institutions Is redressed. 
The greatest difficulty facing an 
Indigent or illiterate prisoner 
lies in the co l lection of evidence 
before a pleading I s even flied . 
Most pr i soners do not have copies 
o f their court dockets, trial m0-
t Ions, i nd I ctll1ents, or f i na I judg-
ments; nor do they have funds 
and /0 r the ~ecessary ad uc at I on to 
obta I n then.. Many times, thel r 
Inartful requests to the c l erks and 
courts are I gnorad or mi sunder-
stood. Perhaps t he most cr iti ca l 
source of i nformat Ion I s the tr ia I 
transcr I pt. Wh I I e a f i nanc i a I I y 
so I vent prl soner can purchase the 
transcr i pt, such I s far beyond the 
.. eans of the Indigent. How then can 
they properly present their claims 
and avoid a findIng of "frlvo-
l ousness'l or slJI'I'H'Dary di smissa l 
without a transcr i pt? Do they even 
possess the knowledge to Identify a 
l egal error, and shou l d they be 
expected to? 
The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that there I s no genera I or 
constitutional right to obtain a 
trial transcript to search for 
errors that might be presented in a 
post-conv I ct I on proceedi ng, to a I d 
I n the preparat ion of a federa I 
habeas petition. Mayer v. Chicago, 
404 U.S. 189 ( 1971 ) • Rather, 
By Permission of Johnny Hart and News Group Chicago, Inc. 
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prisoners must first spec l flcally 
state their clal .. s and legal Issues 
in a coll atera l petition and then 
shov a particularized 
transcript to prove 
Draper v. Wash I ngton, 
(19631. The Kentucky 
need for the 
entitlement. 
372 U.S . 487 
courts have 




federal counterparts. See, 
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 3Bb 
465 (1965); Stinnett v. 
Cannv::onwealth, Ky .. 452 S.W.2d 613 
(1970); Glilium v. Commonwealth, 
Ky., 652 S.W.2d 856 ('983). Equal 
protection argu~ents 
Griffin v. Illinois, 
(1956), have l arge l y 
based on 
351 U.S. 12 
been unsuc-
cessful, even though such "tools· 
are ava I I ab len for a pr I ce to 
others?" .!2... at 19 . The United 
States Supreme Court answered such 
arguments by not i rig al I that 
justice requires i s an adequate 
opportun i ty to fairly present one's 
cla l .. , and not an absolute equal 
opportunIty to present that same 
cla im . United States v. MacCollom, 
426 U.S. 317 (1976). See a l so, 
Glilium v. Canmonwea lth, supra, at 
858. On I y one federal ci rcu I t court 
has found an equal protection vio-
lat ion when the trial courT refUSed 
to provide the prl soner with a 
transcript. The Seventh Circuit 
held in Rush v. Uni ted States, 559 
F.2d 455, 459-60 17th Clr. 1977) , 
the a preexl st I ng transcr I pt IIUSt 
be prov I ded free of cost to an 
I nd i gent federa I pr I soner for use 
In a collateral proceed I ng because 
by BraDt parker and J'OhDD7 haJ't 
we"l"thy prl soners could hire 
a't"torneys 1"0 search the transcrJ pt 
for error s. wh I I e poor pr i son ers 
couldn't. Such a holding I s appli-
cable to "II records available to 
the public but not the prisoner. 
In such a sItuatIon, the prejudice 
to the Indigent and/or Illiterate 
prisoner I s obvious. The Inmate 
IIUSt rei y on memory, recogn I ze t 'he 
I ega I wrong, a nd then weave the 
Wl"oog Into the facts In a sensIble 
manner. Fall ure to do so can lead 
to dismissal and even the loss of a 
meritorious claill. Of course, this 
doesn't happen to a person of 
... ans. l4or"eover. even I f the cia 1m 
survives the pleading stage, In the 
federa I system, appol ntment of 
counsel Is discretionary, 28 U.S.C. 
, 191 5(d), while In Kentucky the 
Issue Is controlled by the Public 
Advocacy statute, court rules, and 
case law. 
In Commonwealth v. Ivey, Ky., 599 
S.W.2d 456 (1980), the Kentucky 
SuprBtDe Court reconc II ed the con-
flicting provisions of KRS 
31.110(2) and RCr 11.42. Although 
RCr 11.42(5) provides for the 
appolnt ... nt of counsel If an evi-
dentiary hearing Is required, the 
statutory requl rements of KRS 
31.110(1) and (2) entitle a con-
victed Indigent representation by 
an attorney In any post-<:onvlctlon 
prooe9dl ngs to the Same extent as a 
person having his own counsel Is so 
entitled. The Court concluded that 
RCr 11.42 set the 1111 n ImuDl standard 
for appol ntment of counse I, wh II e 
the statutory language evidenced a 
legislative deciSion to carefully 
consider Indigents l!!:.£.~ pleadings 
to avoid the preclusion of a 
potentially meritorIous claim. 
However, the expans I ve read I ng 
gIven by the ~ Court has been 
eroded by subsequent case I aw. In 
Ray v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 633 
S.W.2d 71 (1982), Ray sought to 
at"tack the underpinnings of his 
first degree PFO conviction with a 
CR 60.02 motion. He tendered a 
MOtion requesting the assistance of 
counse I. Th I s request was den I ed. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
held that KRS 31.110( I) does not 
provIde for t he appointment of 
counsel for one who Isn't In 
detention and not under formal 
charges. The Court reasoned that 
Ray was not ent itled to counsel at 
state expense because he wasn't 
beIng detained on the enhancing 
convictIons but on the 1980 PFO 
convictIon. 
prIsoner Is 
Thus, an Indigent 
not entItled to the 
appointment of counsel In preparIng 
a post-convlctlon petItion If he Is 
not In "detention," oot he I s 
entitled to counsel It the court 
schedules an evidentiary hearing on 
the motion. This result Is clearly 
I ncons I stent wi th ..!.:!!l. where the 
SuprBl1l8 Court emphatically stated 
that ass I stanoe of counse I was 
necessary to prevent an erroneous 
deprivatIon of valid grounds for 
voiding a conviction. 
Subsequent Kentucky cases have 
given even a more technica l reading 
to the right of appol nted counse I 
In post-conviction proceedings. 
Allen v. Comrw::>nwea.lth, Kyo, App .. 
668 S.W.2d 556 (1984), held that a 
wr Itten request for the assl stance 
of counse I "at" 0.- " I n" the 
evidentiary hearing dId not Invoke 
the..!.:!!l. right to counsel. FInally, 
In Beech .... v. Commonwealth, Ky., 
657 S.W.2d 234 (1983), counsel .. as 
denied an Indigent prisoner "",rely 
because the language of the 101 ... 0-
graphed torm affidavit of Indlgency 
was Insufficient to constItute a 
specific request for counsel. 
Whether the appol ntment of counse I 
In post-cony I ctlon proceed I ngs I s 
dIscretionary, as In the federal 
courts, or an obstacle course of 
technica li ties as In Kentucky, both 
pose for the i nd igent andlor 
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uneducated an unconstitutional 
barrier to relief. 80th approaches 
Invidiously dl scrlmlnate between 
rIch and poor, the 1111 terate and 
educated. This glarIng unfaIrness 
Is perhaps the most persuasive 
argument fo.- the assl stance of 
counsel In the prison setting. 
The Bounds right of access to the 
courts, obviously requires access 
to implements, .... terlals and the 
.... lls for Its exercIse. Early on, 
the United States Supreme Court 
recogn I zed that due process and 
equal protection prevented the 
ra I sIng of fI nanc I a I obstac les to 
an Indigent Inmate's assertion of 
post-con ... lctlon r_dles. In ~ 
.... Bennett, 365 U.S. 706 (1961), 
the court concluded that requiring 
an IndIgent prisoner to pay a four 
dollar statutory fill ng fee, before 
being a llowed to pursue a pet i tion 
for habeas corpus I n state court, 
den I ed the pr I soner equa I protec-
tion of the law. But financial 
obstacles stili face the I ndigent 
pr I soner that can dangerous l y I Ir.i t 
the opportun i ty for them to present 
their claims In courT. While 
Indlgency is defined by federal and 
state statutes and I nterpreted Oil 
cas .... by-case bas I s upon the 
prisoners entire financial picture, 
oorrectlonal offlcla·ls have opted 
for a clear-cut rule. 
The federa I standard I s found In 
Adk I ns .... E. I. Dupont de Nemours 
and Company, 335 U.S. 331, 339 
( 1948). There the Supreme Court 
defIned indlgency as "persons who 
cannot payor give security for 
oourt costs without deprl ... lng 
themse lves or their dependents of 
the necessities of life." Ken-
tucky's definition, for the purpose 
of allevla"ting .:ost5, is similar. 
See, KRS 435.190; Braden v. Com-
monwea lth , Ky., 277 S.W.2d 7 
(1955); Gabbard v. Lair, Ky., 528 
S.~.2d 615 (1975). Moreover, as 
Sowder v. "'eGulre, 516 F.2d 820, 
824 (3rd Clr. 1975) compassionate ly 
recognized: 
[Wle do not think that prisoners 
must t otall y deprive themselves 
of those sma I I amen I ties of life 
which they are pennltted to 
acquire In prison ••• beyond "the 
food, cloth I ng, and I odgl ng 
a I ready fLlrn I shed by the state. 
An account of S50.07 waul d not 
purchase many such a.=enltles; 
perhaps cigarettes and some oc-
c,aslonal readIng materIal. These 
need not be surrendered In order 
for a pr I soner. • • to II t i gate .!!!. 
forma pauperis In the district 
court. 
Kentucky correctIonal off ici a l s 
have estab II shed a OIu ch more 
stringent definition of Indlgency 
to Insure that access to Implements 
such as copying machines, postage, 
and other mater I a I s i s not abused 
by the "indigent" Inmate. For the 
purpose of Judicial access , 
Corrections' Policy lind Procedure 
14.4 defines IndIgent as "Inmates 
who have maintaIned a balance In 
their Inmate account of f!ve 
do l lars or less tor thirty days 
prIor to request Ing Indlgancy 
status." Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 
352 (10th Clr. 1978), supports this 
policy. Clearly, this definition 
requIres C011plete destitution, d .... 
pr Ives the r nmate of even the 
simple and most basIc amenities and 
fa I I s to cons I der the camp I ete 
finanCial status, as for exa,.ple, 
one's need to support dependents. 
Surely, this does not comport with 
the due process requirement's of 
access to the courts. Certainly, It 
does discourage prisoner litigation 
by forcing the Indigent Inmate Into 
a "fbbson's choice." Stili, reny 
courts have held that "prisoners do 
not have an unlimited right to free 
postage In connee-tlon with the 
right of access to the courts." ~. 
at 359. 
It Is clear that a prisoner who Is criticizing the Supreme 
categorIzed by CorrectIons as Indl- notion that mere access 
Court's 
to I a .. 
gent, cannot hope to compete "I th a 
wealthIer celillate. The Inmates 
l ega l correspondence to the courts, 
legislators, and attorneys I s 
severe ly restricted, wh lie the 
ability to photocopy pleadings, 
root Ions and letters I s a I most 
nonex I stent, unle ss one can pay the 
prIce. Yet, when compared with 
other systems across the country, 
the Kentucky pr I soner' s ri ght of 
access to the Judicial machinery Is 
far more protected due to the 
ava II abll I ty of counsel at the 
penal Institutions, federal co"rt 
rulIngs, and Kentucky l aw. 
Johnson v. Avery, supra, at 487, 
pointed ou~ that In 1967 82 percent 
of all prlsone~s had not completed 
high schoo l , while 55 percent had 
not finished the eighth grade. In a 
nora recent case, Hooks v. 
Wa I nwr I ght, 536 F .SuPP. 1330 (M.D. 
Fla. 1982), rev'd., No. 84-2756 
(11th Clr. 1985), reh'g pending, 
the 0 I str Ict Court hel d that the 
st ate was constitut ional ly required 
to provide for attorney ass i stance 
to pr I soners for the fill ng of 
call atera I act Ions. Bas I ng Its 
dec i sion on Bounds v. Scnlth, supra, 
Hooks expanded Bounds by 
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libraries Is 8 suff ici ent method to 
assure meaningful access to the 
courts. After three lengthy 
ev ident i ary hearIngs, the ~oks 
court found that prisoners were 
generally unab Ie to understand 
legal materials, ..!2... 1343; were 
largely illiterate, ~. 13J7-38; 
that most legal reporters required 
a college level reading ability, 
Id.; and, most "jailhouse lawyers" 
were Ineffective. ~. The Court 
concluded that no adequate means 
exl sted to I nsure effect I 'Ie access 
to all prisoners without attorney 
assistance. The Eleventh Circuit 
reversed holdl ng that there I s no 
automatic constitutional right to 
legal representation In federal 
habeas corpus proceedings. Although 
a motion for rehearing is pending, 
sooner or later the Supreme Court 
wIll have to face this I ssue and 
decide the parame"ters of meaningful 
court access. 
Any attorney that assists prisoners 
I s frustrated by the procedura I 
nightmares of ~ ~ filings; by 
Inl1ll!tes who Insist on pursuing 
frIvolous cla l~s; and, by the mis-
handling of merItorious applica-
tions for relief, some of _hlob are 
permanently lost. It Is the loss of 
a meritorious claim, that erroneous 
deprivation, that best d~nstrates 
the constitutional right of attor-
ney ass I stance. When one exa~1 nes 
the const i tutiona l contours of the 
Bounds right of access, It I s easy 
to see _hy meanIngful access 
requires attorney ass istance. 
A pr I soner has two Interests .hen 
seek I ng to co I I atera I I Y attack a 
judgment. There I s an underlying 
grl evance that slhe wi shes to 
remedy, and a separate, but related 
Interest In being able to use the 
courts. It Is this latter Interest 
ttJat serves as the foundat I on tor 
the right of access. Access 
req u ires not ooly that the pr i sone r 
h" ve an op port un I t y to present the 
c laim t o the Co<Jrt , bu t that the 
c laim recei ve f a i r judicial con-
slde r " tlon . See Bonner v . City of 
Prichard , 661 f .2d 1206, 1212- 13 
(11th Clr . 1981) . ThI s does not 
mea n that every c la im mu s t be heard 
on t he ... r lts. Ra the r , It mean s 
tha t the c la im I1>Ust be f a irly 
consider e d by the courts In Its 
s ubstantI ve a nd/ or pr oced ura l pos-
ture. So, If due process requ i r es 
sane degree of j ud ici al cons i -
derat ion of al l c la i ms properly 
pr esented, that the pr I soner has a 
cor r e I"t I ve r Ight to pres,ent those 
f acts M d Issues necessary to 01>-
t "l n f a i r cons lder"tl on of hi s or 
her cla llll. A pr i soner wI l l be de-
pr i ved o f the r Ight t o t a lr cons id-
e r atl on, and thus acc e ss , when due 
t o Ind l gency, II l iterac y or lack ot 
e ducat i on, s / he Is unab le t o pre-
sent the gri e va nce adequat e ly to 
the cour t , so the court can not 
fu l ly cons ider the c l"l . In othe r 
words, t he r ight t o rece ive a fa l r 
cons I derat I on I n cour t, der I ved 
fran t he right of access to pe-
t i t Ion t he courts, generates the 
r ight to attorney asslst"nce. When 
one ba lances the rI sk ot erron-
eous l y depriving the prlsoner-
/petltloner of " f air consideration 
of the clal .. I f attorney ass i s t ance 
Is denied, agains t the government ' s 
Interest In security, punishment, 
rehabilitation, and fiscal objec-
tives, It Is clear that wi thout 
attorney "ss I stance, the court Is 
unable to ~ke a f "lr determination 
whether a clal.. Is meritor i ous. 
Such an argu .... nt Is bolstered by a 
study of pro ~ Inmate fl lings 
which found that the eMpi r ical data 
Indicated that IIOst prl soners 
pleadings are summar i ly dismissed. 
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A St udy 
of Prisoner ~ 1983 Su i ts In t he 
Federal Courts, 92 Harv. l. Rev. 
610, n. 149, "t 617-21 (1979). 
Only 4.2 percent of the c laims pro-
ceeded to trllli • ..!..!. at 618. More-
over, the ""'Jor f actor at fectl ng a 
petitIon' s poten t ia l t o survive 
s u."mary di smIssa l ha s been whether 
a n attorney pre pa red the prisoner's 
plead I ng • ..!..!. Another study shows 
that the dl s ml ssa l rate ot habeas 
corpus peti t Ions for procedural 
defects was a s izeable fifty-five 
pe r c ent. Ses F L. Ya ckle, Post-
Conv ict io n Remedies, 43 3 n . 16 
(1981 ) , sugges ting t hat me r itorIous 
as we ll as frivolous cl a ims are 
los t . For a gene r a l di s cus sion , 
See, Lin, A Prisoner' s Cons tt -
t ut lona l Right t o Attorney Assis-
t a nce, 83 Co lumb i a Law Re view , 1279 
(1983 ) • 
Provi d In g a ttor ne y ass i s tance In 
the Ini t Ia l stages of collateral 
rev i ew would benef It not only t he 
I nd I gent and uneducated but t he 
c ourts. Co<Jnse I can d I st I ng u I s h 
good cases f r om bad a nd preven t 
pr ocedura l messes and pIecemea l 
l Iti gati on. Desp ite thi s r at iona l e, 
unde r present l aw t here Is no 
bl an ke t const i tuti ona l r ight t o 
ass i stance of cou nse l In co l lat-
era l proceed I ngs. Rather, counse I 
Is not appointed unt il a pr i soner 
has made a co lorab le clai m for 
rel ief. Johnson v. Avery, ~ 
Canmonwell ith v. Ivey, supra. 
Because uneducat'ed I'r I soners cannot 
effect i vely use sophi sticat ed l egal 
..aterlals, and because It Is ob-
v i ous that In d i gent prisoners do 
not have the same access to at-
torneys as the I r moneyed counter-
parts, on l y a few stat es have 
estllbllshed pr i son lega l services 
to provl de attorney ass I stance to 
I nmates at t he preparation stage of 
t heir pleadings. Kent ucky Is such a 
state. 
The Bounds dec i sion establ i shed II 
const i tut iona l r i ght ent i t li ng 
prisoners to be prov i ded wi t h 
either "access to l aw libraries or 
he l p from persons trai ned in t he 
law. n Bounds v. St.1 t h, supra at 
817 , 821. The Un I ted St ates 
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01 s tr I ct Court for the West e rn 
District of Kentuc ky broad ly Inter-
preted Bounds and Initiated a 
program of attorney ass I stance for 
all state penal institut ions. In 
Ca nterlno v. Wil s on, 562 F.Supp. 
106 (W.O. Ky. 1983), the Court 
found that the I nadequacy of 
a vail abl e j a ilhouse lawyers ma n-
da t ed that pr ison offici a l s provide 
access to a ttorneys. The Cour t 
s t ated t hat the r ight of access to 
t he Co~rt inc ludes: 
For thos e inma tes who posse ss 
Ins uffi c i en t Inte llectua l or ed u-
cat iona l ab iliti es t o pe rmi t 
r ea sonab le comprehe ns ion of t he i r 
legal c la ims , a provl slon ••• to 
a II ow them to c anmun I cat e .. i th 
someone who ••• 1 s capab Ie of 
t rans lat ing t heir comp la i nts into 
an understanda bl e presentat ion. 
.!.!. a t 111. 
The same I nadeq uac y .. as found In 
Ke ndr ic k v . Bl a nd, 586 F.Supp. 1536 
( 1984). 
When the pr i son door shuts, the 
doors t o the courthouse must r~ l n 
open to a l l on an equa l foot;nij. 
AI I pr I soner's rich or poor , ed u-
cated or i I II terate, must have the 
const i tut iona l r ight to e f fectively 
air thei r gr ievances by petIt ioning 
the courts. Otherwi se, "lII9anlngful 
access" i s mean i ng less. We cannot 
a l low our society to silence 
Gi deon's t rumpet. Access to attor-
ney ass i stance In our pr i sons wi l l, 
at t he very least , Insure that the 
courthouse doors are never c l osed 
to Gideon's dream. 
AlLISON CONNELLY 
""I son Is a 1983 gradlOate of U.K. 
Lo School. For theplI$t 2 YNrs 
slwt has beeo an Assistant Public 
Advoc:at. .t Northpolnt Training 




Confession s of 
Non-Testifying Co-Defendants 
In Marsh v. Richardson, F.2d 
15 SCR 3 at 9 (January 2~1 986) , the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
rev ersed the District Court's denial 
of habeas corpus relief due to the 
i mproper admission of an out-of-court 
statemen t made by a non-testifying 
co-d efendant. Thi s reversal was or-
dered even though the co-defendan t' s 
statement on its face did not in-
criminate Marsh and the trial court 
admonished the j ury to consider the 
co-defendant's statement only against 
him and not against Marsh. 
The Sixth Circuit noted that under 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968) , the critical factor in de-
termining if a Confrontation Clause 
violation occu rred when a confession 
of a non-testifying co-defendant was 
introduced at a joint trial was 
whether there was a substantial risk 
that the jury looked to the statement 
in question in determining the de-
fendant/petitioner's guilt. In as-
sessing whether such a substantial 
likelihood exists, the contested 
statement, its incriminatory nature 
and its role in the case figure 
prominently. The Court stated that in 
determining the incriminatory effect 
of the co-defendant's statement, it 
is proper to consider the other evi-
dence beyond the statement itself. 
The Court cautioned, however, that 
consideration of the importance of 
t he con tested evidence to the prose-
cution is both improper and unneces-
sary. 
Thus, i n this case, the circum-
stantial nature of the other evidence 
and the prosecutor's closing argument 
it 
Donna Boyce 
use of the co-defendant's statement 
against the defendan t created a sub-
stantial risk that the jury woul d 
consider that statemen t against the 
defendant. The Court stated that per-
mitting the admission of a non-
testifying defendant's out-of-court 
statement in circumstances i n which a 
substantial risk exists that it will 
be used against the defendant not 
only denies the Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation, but ra.ises seriou s 
due process concerns regarding the 
validi ty of the conviction and the 
fundamental fairness of the trial 
process. 
DONNA BOYCE 
POLICE CHIEF ORDERS LUNCH 
IN RESTAURAliIT, NOT CHURCH 
A Nashua, New Hampshire, police 
officer may not attend church while 
on his lunch break, because the time 
off "is for the express purpose of 
eating lunch,' his police chief ruled 
earlier this year. 
Officer Fred Williams, a member of 
the First Church Congregational in 
Nashua, had stood in the back of 
church during his break until the 
ban, which he has appealed to the 
state's Public Employee Labor 
Relations Board. The board has not 
yet set a hearing date for Williams' 
complaint. Nashua's city attorney, 
Steven Bolton, said police regu-
lations prohibit officers "from 
entering a public place whi l e on duty 
and in uniform, except to perform a 
police function." The only exception 
is the lunch break, he said. 
-15-
